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Abstract 
 
Drawing upon interview data from three case study organizations, we examine the role of middle 
managers in UK public service reform. Using theory fragments from organizational ecology and 
role theory, we develop three role archetypes that middle managers might be enacting. We find 
that rather than wholesale enactment of a ‘change agent’ role, middle managers are balancing 
three predominant, but often conflicting, changerelated roles: as ‘government agent’, ‘diplomat 
administrator’ and, less convincingly, ‘entrepreneurial leader’. Central government targets are 
becoming the main preoccupation for middle managers across many public services and they 
represent a dominant constraint on allowing ‘managers to manage’. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which middle managers are enacting 
organizational ‘change agent’ roles within contemporary public services. An enduring feature of 
debates about government-led service reform has been the role of the general management 
cadre in service delivery and change (Ferlie, Lynn, and Pollitt 2007). At the hierarchical 
intersection, middle managers can – and indeed must – look both upwards and downwards, and 
thereby reconcile strategic objectives with operational imperatives. The structural 
contingencies and role demands of middle managers have been debated for several decades and 
the management literature contains two dominant narratives about the role as a ‘linking pin’ 
(Likert 1961). 
The first group sees middle layers of management as unsuccessful conduits for senior 
management strategic formulations. These researchers see middle managers as having sclerotic 
effects on structures and processes. Individual managers become trapped in complex 
bureaucratic structures, and by virtue of their intermediate position, inadvertently restrict the 
flow of knowledge and communication across the organization. Others see middle managers as 
more purposefully resisting strategic adaptation by exercising their agency to protect vested 
interests or minimize operational risk (Dopson and Stewart 1990). The image of the ‘reluctant 
middle manager’ cautious to take the initiative or to champion change is a lingering one (Scase 
and Goffee 1989). The second group portrays middle managers more optimistically as strategic 
assets for the mediation and implementation of strategic imperatives. Floyd and Wooldridge 
(1994) see the intermediate position as a privileged location for change agency, where middle 
managers can assist senior managers in formulating concrete strategic initiatives and playing an 
important role in disseminating strategic alternatives. Huy (2001) is even more optimistic and 
sees middle managers as influential agents of entrepreneurial ideas, leveraging informal 
networks and coordinating tensions between continuity and change. Balogun (2003) reviews 
this literature and contributes more empirical data, finding four interrelated roles for middle 
managers during change implementation – undertaking personal change, helping others 
through change, implementing necessary changes in their departments, and keeping the 
business going. This work suggests that there may be scope for middle managers to become 
agents for change in many organizations, but any such activities are constrained by conflicting 
role expectations and operational routines. 
These narratives provide important clues to the role demands and expectations of 
middle managers, and they help to illuminate how intermediate structural positions might 
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connect vertically and horizontally within organizations. However, these streams of work do not 
adequately account for organizational change agency within complex public sector 
organizations. In particular, Floyd and Wooldridge’s typology does not account for role 
demands emanating outside of the organization, such as institutional pressures from 
government agencies and regulators or wider social pressures of public legitimacy. Professional 
bureaucracies face ambiguity and conflict from multiple political, professional, managerial and 
administrative constituents, and individual managers need to negotiate considerable 
institutional pressures from professional constituents looking to increase their power over the 
allocation of resources (Currie et al. 2012). In addition to such ‘institutional work’, there are 
institutional and isomorphic pressures at the sector or population level of organizations, which 
restrain organizational adaptation and reinforce persistent bureaucratic organizational forms 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Hannan and Freeman 1989). Professional bureaucracies, such as 
health care organizations, have complex multiple hierarchies – including medical, nursing and 
administrative–operational chains – which lead to divisional structures and ‘hybrid’ forms of 
managerial work (Fulop 2012). Middle managers in these contexts may have previous 
professional practitioner experience or may be performing a hybrid practitioner–manager role. 
The professional bureaucratic form of division of labour is likely to impact on structural 
contingencies relating to organizational change agency and complicates the discussion of 
middle manager roles. 
Despite their importance for an understanding of public service dynamics and public 
sector reform, Conway and Monks (2011) suggest there is a lack of empirical evidence 
addressing how tensions and ambiguities in the middle manager role are played out in 
contemporary public services, particularly across different organizational types (Currie and 
Procter 2005). The public management literature has largely highlighted competition between 
professional and managerial cadres, and the shifting balance of power between the two (Farrell 
and Morris 2003), or alternatively, the leadership responsibilities of the most senior managers 
or professional elites (Currie et al. 2012). There has been less examination of the perceptions of 
middle managers on their ability to enact change agency roles. As Mantere (2008) reflected in a 
recent discussion of enabling factors in change agency roles, ‘While others have articulated 
middle management roles, there is little evidence about how middle managers are able to fulfil 
those roles’ (p. 26). Equally, Balogun (2003) states: ‘there is still little research examining what 
middle-managers can contribute’ (p. 69). 
In this paper, we examine the structural position and role experiences of middle 
managers in public sector organizations. We bring together literature on middle managers’ 
strategic role with broader debates about public sector managerialism and organizational 
change or inertia. We add to the relatively sparse literature in this area by examining the 
enactment of change agent roles by middle managers within three public sector organizations in 
the United Kingdom under the late New Labour government: an NHS Trust, a local authority and 
a central government department. We review theories attempting to explain structural change 
and inertia and consider how role theory can offer micro-sociological explanations of strategic 
change. We distinguish between three emerging conceptualizations of the middle manager role 
as: ‘government agent’, ‘diplomat administrator’ and ‘entrepreneurial leader’. We then explain 
our methodology, and provide background information on the three case study organizations. 
We explain our findings in relation to the three-fold typology of line manager roles, highlight the 
contribution as well as the limitations of our work, and suggest some directions for future 
research. 
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MANAGING WITH PROFESSIONAL BUREAUCRACY 
 
Despite attempts to make public services more dynamic and adaptable over the last 30 years, 
evidence suggests that bureaucratic forms of organization persist (Farrell and Morris 2003). 
Bureaucratic organizations in the Weberian rational–legal tradition rely on hierarchy and rules 
for coordination and control (Currie et al. 2008; Hales 2002). Although new managerialism was 
associated with a putative move towards more flexible, delayered and decentralized structures, 
Hales’ (2002) research shows that such a transformation is merely ‘illusory’ (p. 61), and that 
hierarchical control and vertical accountability endure, either through re-bureaucratization or 
the creation of neo-bureaucratic structures (Farrell and Morris 2003). Several strands of 
organization theory, such as neo-institutional theory and organizational ecology, suggest that 
organizations are deeply embedded within social, political, economic and normative settings 
that exert isomorphic and inertial population-level pressures to conform to existing and 
established modes of operation (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Hannan and Freeman 1989; 
Goldfinch and Wallis 2010), and, consequently, create an existential tension for organizational 
actors within public services. These issues are intensified at structural positions where 
professional and administrative identities become entangled through ‘hybrid’ practitioner–
manager roles. 
The ‘hybridization’ of management roles in the public sector is an example of longterm 
institutional adaptation to environmental pressures. Public professional bureaucracies across 
most parts of the public sector have responded to sustained policy-led managerialism by 
incorporating the terminology and techniques of business management (Gronn 2000). This 
emerging role definition has lacked comprehensive empirical examination, but has perhaps 
received most attention in health care organizations (Brooks 1999; Llewellyn 2001; Hoque, 
Davis, and Humphreys 2004). For example, in the United Kingdom, NHS general managers were 
introduced at various levels of unit operation following the Griffiths report in 1983. Clinical 
areas of operation are now headed by clinical practitioners, who are also the unit general 
manager with administrative–operational and strategic responsibilities. Reflecting on this 
professional form of managerialism, Fulop (2012) suggests: 
 
Hybridity is not claimed to be a new form of leadership per se but a way of re-orienting 
our thinking, especially in looking at the problems that surround theories and practices 
of heroic and post-heroic leadership. (Fulop 2012: 580) 
 
Other commentators similarly see the term ‘hybrid’ as an oversimplification because it implies 
that we can clearly distinguish between professional and managerial jurisdictions, whereas in 
reality, professional agents, like doctors, are taking on more managerial tasks while, at the same 
time, maintaining both clinical autonomy and professional identity (Exworthy and Halford 
1999). Llewellyn (2001) describes this as attempting to create ‘management from the inside’ 
through clinical–managerial competence, in contrast to ‘management from the outside’, which is 
characterized by centralized planning and performance management. For the purpose of this 
study, we include practitioner–managers occupying intermediate structural positions as bona 
fide middle managers with the potential for change agency roles. We follow recent 
commentators in seeing the ‘hybrid’ role as highly contested, in line with broader debates about 
public sector managerialism and leaderism. Professional managers are likely to experience 
considerable role conflict and ambiguity as they attempt to enact their roles (Doherty, Gatenby, 
and Hales 2010; Pegram et al. 2013). 
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MIDDLE MANAGER THEORY FRAGMENTS 
 
After several decades of research examining the role of middle managers and organizational 
change processes, no dominant theoretical approach has emerged to account for the observed 
phenomena. It is generally agreed that the institutional complexity of bureaucratic structures, 
through which middle managers operate, creates a contested terrain for the enactment of 
change agency roles (Conway and Monks 2011). Many recent contributions to this debate do 
not make explicit reference to theoretical frameworks or attempt to build theory from their 
accounts. Many authors refer to the influential typology of Floyd and Wooldridge (1994, 1997) 
as a way to orientate the middle manager position at an intermediate level of analysis, but do 
not make explicit theoretical propositions beyond this. A closer reading of the work of Floyd and 
Wooldridge reveals an appeal to contingency theories of organizational adaptation (Thompson 
1967). This is the view that organizational change takes place through the matching of 
organizational structures to combinations of technologies and environments. This approach 
moves the question of change beyond the agency of individual managers to encompass higher 
levels of analysis. It is also consistent with the institutional strand of organization theory that 
has been widely adopted in the public administration literature (Currie et al. 2012). 
As the available body of literature suggests, there is unlikely to be a single theoretical 
framework capable of fully explaining the dynamics of organizational change and the role 
enactment of particular managerial levels within this complex system. Instead, we can follow 
Merton (1957) in looking for delimited theories of the ‘middle range’ that explain some focus 
phenomena, but remain relatively fixed to particular levels of analysis. Hannan, Polos, and 
Carroll (2007) also follow this approach and propose the metaphor of ‘theory fragments’ (p. 7) 
as a means of allowing new insights to develop rapidly within a field without addressing the 
formidable challenge of theoretical integration; yet being open and mindful to consistencies 
between theory fragments. ‘Theory fragments’ are different from fragmented or incoherent 
theories, because they recognize the pluralistic and overlapping conceptual fabric on which 
social scientific knowledge is built, and how theory can be coherent yet limited it is explanatory 
power. Rather than working with a single middle range theory or trying to synthesize all 
theories into a metanarrative, the notion of ‘theory fragments’ attempts to place together 
compatible pieces of conceptual fabric and seam them in a constructive patchwork. In this 
paper, we briefly draw on two theory fragments consistent with middle manager change agency 
roles: structural inertia from the theory of organizational ecology and role-set analysis from role 
theory. 
 
Change, inertia and role enactment 
 
Organizational ecology is an influential tradition in organization theory which adapts the logic 
and methodology of biotic ecology to consider the diversity and dynamics of organizational 
forms (Hannan and Freeman 1989). The distinctive approach of organizational ecology is to 
treat the population level of organizations as the main focus for causal explanation. This is in 
stark contrast to mainstream approaches in organization studies and public administration that 
consider change to be the rational adaptation of structures or processes to internal resource 
dependencies. One of the main theory fragments of organizational ecology is the structural 
inertia of organizational forms (Hannan and Freeman 1984). This is the view that for ‘wide 
classes of organizations there are very strong inertial pressures on structure arising from both 
6 
 
internal arrangements (for example, internal politics) and from the environment (for example, 
public legitimating of organizational activity)’ (Hannan and Freeman 1977: 957). Organizational 
rigidity is often considered to be a management problem in the literature on organizational 
change, but according to organizational ecology, structural inertia is not prima facie a 
pathological trait. Rather, inertia offers many benefits for collective action in organizations 
through its ability to establish reliability and accountability (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Both 
of these characteristics are central to the legitimacy and identity of public service organizations. 
For example, patients of health care services are likely to value reliable treatment outcomes 
over experimental variability. Reliable performance requires consistency in organizational 
structure, including the structuring of managerial roles. Any managerial attempts to change 
routines, procedures or behaviours thus become time-consuming and risky. If managers are to 
become change agents, they must obtain slack resources and combine these in novel ways, 
usually with unpredictable results. 
Hannan and Freeman (1984) point out that the existence of strong inertial forces does 
not mean that organizations never change. Instead, it means that organizations respond 
relatively slowly to various threats and opportunities, such as government regime change or 
demographic shifts in demands for services. However, Hannan and Freeman (1984) suggest that 
inertial pressures are much stronger than most theorists of change would acknowledge. The 
organizational ecology perspective has not been widely considered in the management 
literature on change agency and receives only a passing reference in the work of Floyd and 
Wooldridge (1997). 
A second relevant theory fragment is role-set analysis as part of attempts to develop a 
substantive role theory. If organizational ecology starts at the population level and works down, 
role theory starts with individual role incumbents and works up. Following the earlier work of 
Linton (1936) on social structure, the role set is defined as ‘the complement of role-
relationships in which persons are involved by virtue of occupying a particular social status’. 
(Merton 1957, p. 110). Merton recognized that organizational roles face competing expectations 
and demands from various other role incumbents which serve to structure individual 
behaviour. He thought that large-scale bureaucratic structures create relatively enduring role 
sets, which in turn encourage stable role enactments. As intermediate intersecting structural 
positions, middle management roles are likely to be saturated with role-set conflict, and ‘hybrid’ 
managers even more so. 
Role theory, as an attempt to explain the structuring of organizational roles, has been 
criticized by practice theorists for its apparent inability to account for individual agency. 
Mantere (2008) suggests that individual managers are capable of ‘transforming these structural 
conditions through their agency’ (p. 7). However, Mantere unfortunately does not consider 
Merton’s concept of role-set and his argument that role incumbents are capable of transforming 
structural conditions does not help to explain why the evidence suggests that this rarely occurs. 
For example, Mantere (2008) reports, from his empirical research with middle managers, ‘the 
fear that unexpected failures will be punished constrains agency’ (p. 18). 
The concepts of structural inertia and role-set are ‘theory fragments’, which cannot 
easily be unified as an underlying theory of organizational change. To unify them would require 
detailed linking of variables between the micro-sociological context of individual role-sets and 
the macro-sociological context of population dynamics. However, they offer complementary 
theoretical propositions, which help us to explain why change may (or may not) occur in public 
service organizations. Both theories recognize middle managers as contested role incumbents 
embedded in highly complex webs of structural relationships that constrain their room for 
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manoeuvre. The two fragments together provide both an ‘upward’ micro-explanation and a 
‘downward’ macro-explanation that would be missing when using one of the perspectives alone. 
Together they can provide a foundation for more specific conceptual development around the 
role of middle managers as change agents. 
 
Three types of change agent 
 
This section moves the discussion on by providing more explicit theoretical propositions about 
middle managers’ roles by articulating archetypal ‘change agency’ roles that could be enacted 
within public services. Role archetypes can be seen as distilled role definitions which reflect 
theoretically derived role-set formations. The fairly limited available empirical work suggests 
three predominant, and often conflicting, role performances that middle managers play as 
‘change agents’ within public service reform: the ‘entrepreneurial leader’, the ‘government 
agent’ and the ‘diplomat administrator’. We examine each of these in turn. 
In policy rhetoric, the most pervasive role demanded of middle managers under new 
managerialism has been that of ‘entrepreneurial leader’, the requirement to adopt the 
techniques and practices of private sector counterparts in order to lead in the delivery of 
innovative public services and culture change (Currie et al. 2008). This role is founded on a 
belief in the success of public sector leadership to achieve a genuine decentralization of public 
services delivery, allowing ‘leaders to lead’ and ‘managers to manage’ by implementing local 
solutions (Goldfinch and Wallis 2010). Under New Labour, ‘managerialism’ evolved somewhat 
towards a wider ideology of ‘leaderism’, which encompassed notions of culture management 
and entrepreneurialism, radicalizing the nature and focus of organizational change (O’Reilly and 
Reed 2010). This role archetype is consistent with dimensions of Floyd and Wooldridge’s 
(1994) typology that sets out important roles for middle managers in implementing deliberate 
strategy, synthesizing information, facilitating adaptability and championing innovative ideas 
and opportunities. 
The second change agent role for middle managers is that of a ‘government agent’, 
responsible for aligning and adapting central government policy to local situations (Hood 1991), 
and accountable for achieving and monitoring performance against centrally driven targets 
(Power 1997). Tasked with policy implementation, the scope for change agency in this role type 
is limited, and line managers themselves become subject to close performance monitoring with 
a focus squarely on the enactment of government policy, rather than local entrepreneurial 
strategies or leadership transformation (Thursfield 2008). Several studies have shown that the 
‘government agent’ role is an enduring one for public sector line managers (Currie and Procter 
2005), particularly since external relationships with central government departments have 
been shown to be vital for many line managers as part of monitoring and reporting mechanisms. 
A third potential role for line managers is that of the ‘diplomat administrator’, 
negotiating the boundary between managerial imperatives, on the one hand, and the demands 
and needs of professional elites, on the other (Harrison and Pollitt 1994). Under new 
managerialism, the trend has supposedly been towards the empowerment of line managers and 
the wrestling of power away from professional groups. However, in a study of social services, 
housing and hospitals, Ackroyd, Kirkpatrick, and Walker  (2007) show that outcomes vary 
across sectors, and are not necessarily directly linked with the level of investment in reform. 
The values and working practices of dominant professional groups can become entrenched and 
a shift towards managerial prerogatives and priorities is difficult to achieve in the face of what 
is sometimes ‘overt antagonism’ towards managerialism (Syrett, Jones, and Sercombe 1997, p. 
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160). It is unclear from available empirical evidence the extent to which these role archetypes 
are being enacted by middle managers in contemporary public services. Despite a stream of 
policy rhetoric under New Labour proselytizing a more dynamic and responsive public sector, 
there is very little evidence to suggest that any significant changes to organizational structures 
and managerial practice have occurred.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In order to explore the potential ‘change agent’ role of middle managers in contemporary public 
service organizations, we undertook case study research in three parts of the UK public sector: 
the NHS (‘AcuteTrust’), local government (‘LocalGov’) and central government (‘GovDep’). 
These organizations had volunteered to be part of a research project involving case studies of 
both public and private sector organizations to investigate organizational change and manager–
employee work experiences. They constitute a convenience sample, although their typicality 
was ascertained in terms of descriptive statistical indicators of service provision, organizational 
structure, workforce size and performance measures within their respective sectors. This paper 
presented an opportunity to explore in more detail the specific debates within public 
management pertaining to organizational change and management role experiences. 
Sixty-one interviews were conducted (twenty-one at LocalGov and twenty at both 
GovDep and AcuteTrust) during 2008. Participants included line managers from various 
functions, senior managers, HR managers, accountants, clinicians (at AcuteTrust), professional 
and support staff. Many professional or specialist interviewees also had some line management 
responsibility in a ‘hybrid’ form, and for the purpose of this study, we include practitioner–
managers occupying intermediate structural positions as bona fide middle managers with the 
potential for change agency roles. In total, forty-four middle-level line managers at the second 
or third rung of the hierarchy with general management responsibility were interviewed. 
Interviewees were selected by their respective HR departments. Similar to other studies looking 
into the role of middle managers (e.g. Conway and Monks 2011), we focus mainly on the views 
of middle managers themselves, although reference is also made to the opinions of other 
informants including senior managers, HR managers, accountants and support staff. This 
comparative analysis illuminates how the role of the middle manager is played out in practice in 
relation to other organizational actors. Following other authors, we do not discriminate 
theoretically between second and third line managers (Mantere 2008; Currie and Procter 2005). 
Following earlier comments, we also do not distinguish empirically between business managers 
and hybrid practitioner–managers, as both types of roles have the potential for change agency. 
Instead, we adopt a more general conception of middle-level ‘line managers’ as a distinct cadre 
of employees with potential responsibility for a wide range of tasks, including, but not limited 
to, operational control and supervision, resource allocation, business planning and strategy 
formulation, performance management, cross-department communication and knowledge 
sharing, managing change initiatives and people management. Although there is likely to be 
some difference in emphasis between operational and strategic matters at the second-lines or 
third-lines, the roles share many common features at the interface between centre and 
periphery of the organization and for our study of ‘change agent’ roles can therefore be feasibly 
considered together. 
In order to explore the enactment of ‘change agent’ roles by line managers, the 
interviews were in-depth, semi-structured and focused primarily upon managers’ experiences 
of their role and of recent changes, their views of government reforms and experiences of 
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implementing these, and the general working environment. Interviews with other 
organizational actors focused on their personal experiences of change, and the roles played by 
themselves and middle managers. Secondary documentation, including policies, departmental 
reports and performance data were also collected. All interviews were digitally recorded and 
transcribed. Analysis of the data took place in three stages. First, middle manager role 
definitions and role demands/expectations from role senders and role incumbents were coded. 
Second, the data was coded for broader institutional constraints on the role as change agent, 
including considerations of government policy, audit inspection and sector pressures. Third, the 
two sets of codes were consolidated for the three cases in an iterative fashion, moving between 
the data and theory. The emerging themes were based on comparative reduction of intra- and 
inter-case analysis (Eisenhardt 1989). 
 
Case studies 
 
Local government – LocalGov 
 
During New Labour’s tenure as the UK Government, centre-led local government policies were 
overtly aimed at the ‘radical refocusing of councils’ traditional roles’ and designed to replace 
bureaucratic structures and the ‘culture of paternalism and inwardness’ (Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions 1998, pp. 5–8). A headline reform in Labour’s first 
term was the Best Value (BV) regime, which encouraged local authorities to regularly review 
their services and make continuous improvements. In England, BV was replaced by the 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) during 2002–2003. This extended BV by 
providing ‘a framework for continuous improvement in the quality of local government 
services’ (DTLR 2001, p. 23). Although these reforms did not prescribe in detail how local 
authorities should organize themselves, nor specify accountabilities, it might reasonably be 
conjectured that middle managers’ formal responsibility for the coordination and delivery of 
frontline services would imply a strengthening of their role. 
Our case study organization, LocalGov, is a large local authority in England. Services are 
managed within ten geographic constituencies. In collaboration with the community and local 
strategic partners, LocalGov has developed a strategic vision for the city. The council has 
undergone significant change and restructuring in recent years. Following the Single Status 
Agreement in 1997, all council pay scales were unified. LocalGov had only recently implemented 
these changes across the council, with varied outcomes for staff groups. In 2006, internal 
employee surveys indicated that employees felt disempowered and demotivated. In response, 
LocalGov became keenly interested in employee involvement and decided to initiate a 
programme of improvement based on a new set of organizational values. The council launched a 
new leadership development programme for managers and staff geared towards a more 
participative approach to organizational change. Middle-level line managers were expected to  
support this programme. 
 
National Health Service – AcuteTrust 
 
The NHS was subject to ambitious organizational reforms during the 2000s, many of which 
appeared to signal a new role for management. The NHS Plan (DoH 2000) set out New Labour’s 
ideas for improving the health service. This emphasized centralized targets for waiting times, 
referrals and, later, infection control. Quality became an important aspect of NHS reform, 
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particularly through the notion of clinical governance, evidence-based medicine and the 
creation of new external regulators. Decentralization was also a common component of the 
government’s rhetoric on improving health care. Pushing control and responsibility to local 
organizational units as a continuation of post-Griffiths reforms was said to foster a more 
competitive and innovative service environment. However, the emphasis on targets retained an 
important role for central government as arbiters of service performance. Furthermore, the 
work of national bodies such as the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
means the scope for local decision-making has often been curtailed. 
AcuteTrust is an NHS foundation trust based in the north of England. It is a large 
hospital with 4,500 staff providing acute health care to a population of over 300,000. During the 
fieldwork, the hospital had 860 inpatient and 105 day care beds. The trust’s services are 
organized into fifteen clinical business units, grouped by three main divisions: medicine and 
emergency, surgery, and support services. Foundation Trust status means the organization has 
increased independence from government regulation and can reinvest any surpluses back into 
improving service delivery. According to measures at the Department of Health, the Trust was 
performing well, having delivered the 18-week waiting list targets and cancer targets. As part of 
a costreduction programme, the organization underwent a restructure in 2007 when all general 
managers were asked to reapply for their jobs. Around 3 per cent of the workforce is classed as 
management. The largest group is that of the general middle managers, called clinical business 
managers (CBM), who work alongside clinicians and finance to drive change and manage the 
operations of each clinical unit. 
 
Civil Service – GovDep 
 
The UK civil service has also experienced its own reforms. Bovaird and Russell (2007) reviewed 
the Civil Service Reform (CSR) programme during New Labour’s first term, and suggested that, 
in contrast to the local government reforms of BV and CPA, the aim was to achieve ‘step change’ 
rather than continuous improvement. There are also themes common to the other public 
services, such as responsiveness to public need, resource usage and ‘quality’ issues. Prior 
research on managers within the civil service has suggested that central government control 
continued to prevail despite some minor local flexibility (Bovaird and Russell 2007). 
GovDep is a large central government department covering several customer-facing 
business areas. We studied one of the larger agencies within the department. The agency has 
offices in various locations across England, including the south-east, the midlands and the north. 
The agency has over 16,000 employees and its services are used by around 15 million UK 
citizens. It has recently undergone considerable change as a result of a merger between two 
previously separate business units. This led to a new management structure and around 1,000 
job cuts. Like many areas of the civil service, there is an efficiency drive with an overall 
reduction in financial allocation in the short and medium terms. There is standardization of 
management grades across the agency, including line manager posts, Executive Officer (EO) and 
Higher Executive Officer (HEO), the middle manager Senior Executive Officer (SEO) and the 
more senior management post, Grade 7. 
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FINDINGS 
 
Entrepreneurial leader 
 
As described earlier, the entrepreneurial leader is the dominant role prescribed in New Labour 
policy rhetoric across the major public services. The interviews yielded little evidence of middle 
managers enacting such a role. The closest example was at AcuteTrust, where managers were 
involved in developing proposals for increasing service capacity and integrating a range of 
service activities within the auspices of a process of business and financial planning referred to 
as ‘business cases’. One line manager explained: 
 
The main project I’m working on at the present is part of a reformation of the surgical  
division where the number of beds is [being] reduced by twenty-three. …So there are a 
lot of difficult issues that we have to look after … and that’s really my priority at present. 
 
However, even in these instances, the primary focus for middle management was on day-to-day 
operational issues. These included such matters as managing capacity within AcuteTrust, and 
managing services within LocalGov and GovDep. In the words of one line manager within 
GovDep, ‘people are just busy churning out the work, and there isn’t always time for 
improvements’. 
The second area of focus for middle managers was on implementing an increasing array 
of ‘private sector-style’ initiatives developed by senior managers, often in consultation with 
external consultants, but in the development, they themselves had little or no say. In the 
majority of cases, middle managers opposed the planned changes as irrelevant, inappropriate or 
unhelpful, and yet were expected not only to help implement the changes, but also to secure 
staff buy-in. For example, at AcuteTrust, a large ‘lean’ project was being rolled out across the 
hospital in order to improve the flow of clinical ward processes. Middle managers were 
responsible for implementing ‘re-engineering solutions’ proposed by senior managers, the HR 
department and management consultants. Several middle-level line managers described these 
changes as difficult to keep pace with, ‘confusing’ and ‘frustrating’ due to the rapidity and 
complexity of the suggested reforms. At GovDep, pressure from the centre to involve staff and 
ask them to participate in improvement programmes via suggestion schemes was felt to be too 
far removed from local concerns and perceived as irrelevant by both managers, who were 
expected to implement the scheme, and by staff. Here too, efforts to introduce ‘lean’ processes, 
led by external consultants, were perceived by some managers as ‘not a particularly pleasant 
experience for anybody’, and a means to reduce rather than enhance the authority of middle 
managers and remove them from the decision-making process. 
In LocalGov, where a raft of private sector-style change initiatives was also being 
implemented, the lead was again taken by senior managers and HR professionals. One example 
was a large-scale employee engagement programme which intentionally bypassed the middle 
levels of the hierarchy and appealed to staff directly. Views on the scheme appeared divided, 
with some welcoming the workshops as very positive, and others being more cautious and 
cynical. Many talked of the excessive amount of time and effort that had been expended. 
In all three organizations, middle managers appeared to feel overwhelmed by change 
and improvement initiatives; as one HR Manager in GovDep commented, the organization was 
‘absolutely awash with them’. However, the scope for middle managers to do much more than 
simply acquiesce and attempt, in some way, to implement these initiatives was virtually non-
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existent. It was also evident from interviews with senior managers and HR professionals that 
their perception was that middle managers often lacked the necessary strategic insight and 
technical competencies to be entrusted with the role of ‘entrepreneurial leader’. Middle 
managers were aware of this and one clinical business manager within AcuteTrust recalled the 
Chief Executive stating that many middle-level line managers lacked the financial skills to write 
an effective business case, skills that this manager agreed she probably did lack. Similarly, 
within GovDep, the senior managers’ perception was that middle managers lacked budgetary 
management skills, one manager contrasting the enthusiasm of senior managers and staff with 
the that of the ‘middle band’, where initiatives became blocked by ‘reluctant middle managers’ 
(SEO). 
 
Government agent 
 
It was evident across all three case studies that the impetus to meet centralized service targets 
had become increasingly pervasive. Almost every manager could link the work of their 
department to ‘very clear targets’ set by governmental bodies, including patient waiting time at 
AcuteTrust, caseload processing time at GovDep and efficiency savings at LocalGov. Most agreed 
that organizational structures and goals were determined more by government policy and 
central government departments than by managers within the organization. Having targets 
often created clear conditions for the way services were delivered, leaving little scope or slack 
resources for initiative at the local level, as noted by a middle manager at GovDep: 
 
I think when your targets are set at the beginning of the year and you know they’re not 
going to change throughout the year … where you are talking about making continuous 
improvements you’re tinkering at the edges because so much is set way and above our 
control, but that’s just the nature of the beast. (EO) 
 
Similar views were expressed at LocalGov, where targets were developed at a national or 
regional level with input from politicians and then ‘cascaded’ through each level until they 
reached individual line managers: 
 
My department has an overall strategy that’s given to us by the Council and then we 
have a committee that gives us more specific and sometimes separate targets, but it’s 
something that’s all achieving the main Council aim, and then that’s brought down to me 
personally as part of my … personal development review. (Middle manager) 
 
Government-led targets were recognized by many interviewees, particularly senior managers, 
as the main form of control and accountability for all management groups. Senior managers at 
GovDep were particularly forthcoming about the influence of targets on the role of middle-level 
line managers: 
 
If we weren’t achieving targets, people out there would know about it more than they do 
now, because I have bi-weekly discussions with my managers, and if we weren’t 
achieving our targets, I’d be round them like a robber’s dog, if you know what I mean 
(SEO) 
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Similarly, at AcuteTrust, one business manager noted how she had to suddenly switch her 
attention to national cancer targets because of an influx of referrals in this area: ‘probably most 
time is spent firefighting around targets… [that might be] around access targets or a patient is 
going to breach a target’ (CBM). Respondents in all three organizations expressed mixed views 
about the value of government targets. Although senior managers and some professional groups 
found them useful for performance monitoring and incentivizing staff, the target setting process 
was far removed from the local situation, and middle managers frequently felt that most targets 
were not realistic or attainable and therefore created significant and unnecessary pressure. 
 
Diplomat administrator 
 
The majority of managers in the study described their workplaces as ‘highly complex’ and this 
was often linked to ‘political battles’ about how they conducted themselves. For example, 
middle managers at AcuteTrust often managed across several clinical units and frequently more 
than one department would require their attention at any one time. This led to significant 
pressure and role conflict for individual managers, particularly when powerful professional 
actors, such as senior doctors, would make demands and expect them to respond quickly: 
 
It’s very challenging to try and fit it all in, particularly with all of my areas at the moment 
expanding. I’m not fitting everything into a day, I’m working longer hours just basically 
to get things done. (Middle level service manager) 
 
Some managers felt they had some autonomy to manage their own priorities around business 
needs, but the pace of service delivery often meant they needed to be reactive and had little time 
for planning and careful negotiation. This proved very difficult for many politically sensitive 
areas which spanned professional divides. For example, business managers recalled being 
caught between the competing interests of doctors, nurses and senior managers, where the only 
way to cope was to be as ‘diplomatic’ as possible and build good relationships with individual 
clinicians. The business case process at AcuteTrust, referred to earlier, offered a potential 
avenue for management influence. However, each case required the involvement of a variety of 
professionals, including consultants, ward sisters and matrons, alongside accountants and 
senior managers. The real decision-making for business case proposals took place at a senior 
level between divisional accountants, board directors and clinical directors, and so middle 
managers often found this process politically frustrating: 
 
I don’t think we fully operate as a clinical business unit. I don’t think we operate having 
autonomy for our businesses. I think some of that is still handled by the finance 
department, and that’s because finance ruled this Trust for many years rather than the 
clinicians or the business managers. (CBM) 
 
Management consultant-led improvement initiatives, such as lean, were also felt to offer little 
scope for entrepreneurial leadership. However, one unexpected benefit was the opportunity 
they afforded to develop inter-departmental working relationships. The role of the middle 
manager at the intersection between departments and hierarchical levels was also apparent. 
Within all three organizations, middle-level line managers had little control or influence over 
financial planning and budgets, with decisions taken at more senior and central levels. In many 
of the interviews, middle managers appeared to be cast in the role of passive recipients of 
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important budgetary decisions taken elsewhere in the organization, creating significant 
limitations upon their discretion. In GovDep, one middle manager spoke of the frustration not 
only at having to implement centrally driven change programmes, but also at the lack of scope 
to develop locally relevant solutions and approaches due to budgetary constraints. In LocalGov, 
one middle manager said: ‘I wish my senior managers would at least consult with me before 
they make any radical changes, because I know the business better than they do’. Thus, line 
managers appeared as relatively powerless actors in relation to other, more powerful, groups 
and elites, including professional colleagues and senior managers. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our findings shed light on the lived experience of public service middle managers and their 
ability to enact ‘change agent’ roles in contemporary public services. We examined what role 
middle managers describe themselves as serving, and the activities and behaviours they are 
adopting. 
Two dominant narratives in the literature portray middle managers as either reluctant 
actors unsuccessfully tasked with managing change or as strategic assets with valuable 
contributions to make by linking with senior managers and reconciling strategic aspirations 
with operational requirements (Balogun 2003). Theory fragments from organizational ecology 
and role theory suggest that organizational change will be constrained by inertia forces and 
role-set conflict, although there is some scope for managerial agency. Prior work on role 
typologies has suggested three alternative but overlapping role archetypes for middle 
managers: the entrepreneurial leader, government agent and diplomat administrator. The case 
studies have provided an insight into a range of issues that middle managers are facing in public 
services reform and organizational change. Looking across the three cases, we found some 
variation between sectors. At AcuteTrust, reactive problem-solving, in response to service 
pressures or demands from senior management and clinicians, was a primary factor dictating 
the work of middle managers. Although AcuteTrust was closest to the professional bureaucratic 
form, instances of professional ‘hybridity’ in middle management positions did not lead to more 
convincing change agent roles. At GovDep, there was little scope for managerial budgetary 
involvement and a general perception of polarization between the top and the bottom of the 
organization. At LocalGov, middle managers felt overloaded with senior management initiatives 
and had little scope to contribute their own ideas or implement new ways of working in any 
meaningful way. These differences show that health care organizations are becoming 
increasingly politicized arenas for ‘institutional work’ (Currie et al. 2012), where professionals 
are congregating at senior levels to influence organizational structures for their own ends, 
whereas local government and civil service organizations remain rigid political bureaucracies 
with increasingly instrumental government-facing performance mechanisms. 
Divergent forces among the three public service settings were counteracted by more 
powerful convergent forces at the population level of public sector organizing. These were 
reflected in the commonalities observed in the roles played by middle managers, and in the 
tensions and ambiguities experienced during their enactment. In terms of the much-heralded 
‘entrepreneurial leader’ role, this appeared to be largely absent, lending support to the Currie et 
al. (2008) proposition that the nature and shape of contemporary public services, combined 
with the realities of managerial work, are such that an entrepreneurial role is practically 
impossible. Somewhat more support was found for the ‘diplomat administrator’ orientation, 
and there was evidence of middle managers undertaking complex negotiations between various 
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professional groups and hierarchical levels in order to secure department-level resources. 
However, we also found middle managers frequently cast in a relatively powerless role within 
these networks, with power vested ultimately in senior managers and professional elites. 
Finally, it was evident from our interviews that the most pervasive role was that of the 
‘government agent’, tasked with aligning and evaluating the work of their department with the 
prerogatives of central government, and held accountable for the achievement of government 
goals and reporting schedules (Ackroyd, Kirkpatrick, and Walker 2007). 
The findings revealed five main factors that appeared to constrain the autonomy and 
potential change agent role of middle managers. First, perceptions of middle manager strategic 
and leadership capability by senior managers appeared deprecating, fostering an unwillingness 
to allow managers to exercise much by way of a leadership function, and possibly a lack of 
capability on the part of middle managers themselves. Second, the pressures of day-to-day 
operational work, much of which were short-term and reactionary, were such that finding time 
to take on additional tasks and secure slack resources was problematic. Third, the lack of middle 
managers’ control over important resources and processes such as budgeting, coupled with 
their relative powerlessness in relation to professional elites, served to curtail their scope for 
discretion (Harrison and Pollitt 1994). Fourth, the welter of initiatives driven by senior 
managers cast the middle manager as an unwilling reactionary implementer rather than a more 
empowered leader of change (Balogun 2003). Fifth, the pervasive institutional power of central 
government in determining the scope, scale, direction and monitoring of change agendas within 
public services further constrained what middle managers could develop by way of local 
solutions (Conway and Monks 2011). 
These five factors were overlaid with the apparent endurance of professional 
bureaucratic forms of public service organization with their reliance on hierarchy and standard 
operating procedures (Farrell and Morris 2003), further serving to curtail and constrain the 
freedom and autonomy of individual middle managers. These features appear to lend support to 
the theory of structural inertia, where reliability and consistency is favoured over 
experimentation (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Although New Labour sought to remodel the 
monitoring of the public sector away from centralized rules and towards regulation through 
agencies, the ultimate source of power and control remained in the central government, who 
privilege reliable performance against measureable standards. 
The case studies also highlight the role conflict experienced by line managers as 
suggested by role-set theory (Merton 1957): role incumbents experiencing pressure to keep 
day-to-day operations working smoothly, coping with intensifying levels of work, acquiescing to 
an array of disparate and sometimes competing change initiatives, patiently negotiating 
between professional and managerial groups, ensuring the implementation of government 
policy and monitoring performance against target – whilst also frequently lacking the necessary 
resources, budgets or access to decision-making processes needed to function effectively. Little 
wonder perhaps that the role of the entrepreneurial leader has fallen by the wayside. It should 
also be recognized that this study was conducted during a relatively resource-rich and 
optimistic time for the UK public sector. As we move to a new period of macroeconomic 
austerity with everincreasing demands on resource efficiencies, role demands and conflict are 
only likely to become more severe for middle managers. 
Our combination of theory fragments from organizational ecology and role theory help 
to provide a foundation for more focussed conceptual development. Our study contributes to 
theory by showing that the macro-sociological concepts of organizational ecology are consistent 
with the micro-sociological concepts of role theory. Without attempting to unify the 
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frameworks, we have used these middle-range theories to build more specific role archetypes 
for middle managers in public sector organizations. The role archetypes we found most support 
for were consistent with the propositions of structural inertia. Middle managers can be willing 
change agents, but they must negotiate complex politicized operating environments typified by 
tight resources and demanding operational targets. They may be able to make a stronger 
contribution to organizational change and public sector reform, but this will require the 
conflicted role expectations to be become more relaxed and internally determined, rather than 
conflict between local professional and administrative concerns on one side and centralized 
instrumental performance concerns on the other. 
Although our study has shed light on the enactment of line manager roles, there are 
inevitable limitations. First, we had access to a convenience sample of three organizations in the 
United Kingdom, so although we have gained insight into three different areas of the public 
sector, further research that explores these issues with larger samples of organizations and in 
other national settings would be welcome. Second, our data were obtained by interview, and we 
were limited in the number of interviews we could conduct in each organization. Our findings 
should therefore be taken as indicative of important trends and complexities, rather than as 
representative of the three sectors. Despite these limitations, our findings have implications for 
government policy in the area of public service operation, organizational change and reform. 
The case studies demonstrate convergent trends for middle managers across the UK public 
services. The centralized nature of performance standards has given middle managers a 
prominent role as agents of government rather than as more autonomous business managers. 
Middle managers are also becoming ever more weary of and sceptical towards ‘improvement’, 
‘reform’, ‘modernization’ and ‘change’, and many distance themselves from new initiatives: the 
narrative of the ‘reluctant middle manager’ lives on (Scase and Goffee 1989). The question for 
future policy-makers is therefore whether they wish to promote public services in which the 
management cadre exists primarily to implement centralized objectives and maintain 
consistent standards, or alternatively facilitate a genuinely more ‘managerialist’, or indeed 
‘leaderist’, role for middle managers. If the latter, careful consideration will need to be given to 
the balance between demands for local reform, instrumental performance measurement, 
administration and routine supervision. In particular, policy discourse would need to give more 
consideration for the enactment of the role of managers in local settings, rather than promoting 
generic recipes of managerialism.  
Our study has contributed to the hitherto sparse literature on the role of the middle 
manager as a change agent within public services. Line managers in our study were caught in a 
complex normative and structural web that served to constrain their discretion and autonomy. 
Far from letting ‘managers manage’ or ‘leaders lead’, government reforms appear to have 
fostered an environment in which middle managers’ roles are as constrained by central 
government as they ever were. 
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